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With the advent of molecular biology, genomics, and proteomics, the intersection between
science and law has become increasingly significant. In addition to the ethical and legal
concerns surrounding the collection, storage, and use of genomic data, patent disputes for
new biotechnologies are quickly becoming part of mainstream business discussions. Under
current patent law, new technologies cannot be patented if they are “obvious” changes to
an existing patent. The definition of “obvious,” therefore, has a huge impact on determining
whether a patent is granted. For example, are modifications to microarray protocols, popular
in diagnostic medicine, considered “obvious” improvements of previous products? Also, in-
ventions that are readily apparent now may not have been obvious when discovered. Poly-
merase chain reaction, or PCR, is now a common component of every biologist’s toolbox
and seems like an obvious invention, though it clearly was not in 1983. Thus, there is also
a temporal component that complicates the interpretation of an invention’s obviousness.
The following article discusses how a recent Supreme Court decision has altered the defi-
nition of “obviousness” in patent disputes. By examining how the obviousness standard has
changed, the article illuminates how legal definitions that seem wholly unrelated to biology
or medicine could still potentially have enormous effects on these fields.
Just what is obvious or not is a ques-
tion that has provoked substantial litigation
in the Federal Circuit, the appellate court
with special jurisdiction over patent law
disputes. Under U.S. patent law, an inven-
tor may not obtain a patent, which protects
his invention from infringement by others,
if the differences between the subject mat-
ter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that “the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill” in the patent’s subject matter
area [1]. However, what was “obvious” at
the time of invention to a person of ordi-
nary skill is hardly clear and is, in effect, a
legal fiction designed to approximate ob-
jectivity. As illustrated by Chief Justice
John Roberts of the Supreme Court in a
moment of levity, “Who do you get to ...
tell you something’s not obvious … the
least insightful person you can find?” [2]
Despite the apparent objectivity provided
by a “person of ordinary skill” obviousness
standard, the difficulty lies in that such a
standard is still susceptible to multiple in-
terpretations, depending on the point of
view and knowledge ascribed to the “ordi-
nary person.”As such, how obviousness is
defined and interpreted by the courts will
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ogy patents and the biotechnology business.
The issue of obviousness arose inApril
2007 when the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
[3] The facts of the case were anything but
glamorous; in the suit, Teleflex, a manufac-
turer of adjustable pedal systems for auto-
mobiles, sued KSR, its rival, for
infringement of its patent, which
“describe[d] a mechanism for combining an
electronic sensor with an adjustable automo-
bile pedal so that the pedal’s position can be
transmitted to a computer that controls the
throttle in the vehicle’s engine.” [4]Teleflex
believed that KSR’s new pedal design was
too similar to its own patented design and
therefore infringed upon it [5]. In defense,
KSR argued that Teleflex’s patent was
merely the obvious combination of two pre-
existing elements and, thus, the patent, upon
which Teleflex’s infringement claim was
based, was invalid.
Patent law relies on the concept of ob-
viousness to distinguish whether new inven-
tions are worthy of being protected by a
patent. If a new invention is too obvious, it
is not granted a patent and is therefore not a
legally protected property interest. However,
if an invention is deemed not obvious and
has met the other patentability requirements,
a patent will be granted, thereby conferring
exclusive use of the invention to the patent
holder. This exclusive right prohibits others
from making, using, selling, offering to sell,
or importing into the United States the
patented invention [6]. Essentially, the defi-
nition of obviousness sets the balance be-
tween rewarding new inventions with
exclusive property rights and respecting old
inventions by not treating minor variations
of existing patents as new patents. In this
manner, the law seeks to provide economic
incentives for the creation of new inventions
by ensuring that the property right conferred
by the patent will be protected against in-
significant variations. The importance of
where the line for obviousness is drawn and
how clearly it is drawn is especially impor-
tant in the biotechnology industry. Studies
have shown that the development of a new
pharmaceutical therapy can take up to 14
years with costs exceeding $800 million [7].
Such an enormous investment of time and
money would not be practical if it did not
predictably result in a legally enforceable
property right.
The standard for what constitutes a
patentable discovery has evolved over the
last 150 years. In 1851, the Supreme Court
held in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood that a
patentable discovery required a level of in-
genuity above that possessed by an ordinary
person [8]. Lower courts treated the
Hotchkiss standard as a subjective standard,
whereby courts sought to determine “what
constitute[d] an invention” [9] and a “flash
of creative genius” [10]. However, the at-
tempts at imposing the Hotchkiss standard
proved unworkable, and in 1952, Congress
overrode the case law with the Patent Act,
“mandat[ing] that patentability be governed
by an objective nonobviousness standard.”
[11] This new statutory standard moved the
courts away from subjective determinations
and toward a more workable, objective ob-
viousness standard.
While the PatentAct laid the foundation
for the current obviousness standard, the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere
Co. interpreted the statutory language in an
attempt to provide greater clarity as to what
exactly “obvious” meant [12].The Supreme
Court determined that the objective analysis
would require “the scope and content of the
prior art ... to be determined; differences be-
tween the prior art and the claims at issue ...
to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art resolved.” [13] In
addition to analysis under this three-part
framework, the Supreme Court called for
several secondary considerations to be
weighed, including “commercial success,
long felt but unresolved needs, [and the] fail-
ure of others [to solve the problem ad-
dressed].” [13]
Unsurprisingly, lower courts were un-
satisfied with the Supreme Court’s attempts
to clarify the obviousness standard and
sought to provide “more uniformity and
consistency” to their evaluation of obvious-
ness than the Supreme Court’s jumble of
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tency, the Federal Circuit created the “teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation” test (TSM
test) “under which a patent is only proved
obvious if ‘some motivation or suggestion
to combine prior art teachings’can be found
in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or
the knowledge of a person having ordinary
skill in the art.” [14] Through implementa-
tion of the TSM test, the Federal Circuit
sought to maintain the flexibility envisioned
by the Supreme Court in Graham, while at
the same time providing more certainty and
predictability to obviousness determina-
tions.
The issue before the Supreme Court in
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. was whether
the Federal Circuit’s elaboration on the
statutory language of the Patent Act, the
TSM test, was consistent with the terms of
the PatentAct itself and the Supreme Court’s
own analysis in Graham. The Supreme
Court determined that while the TSM test
was, on its terms, consistent with the frame-
work set out in Graham, the rigid manner in
which the Federal Circuit had taken to ap-
plying that standard was inconsistent with
the flexible approach established by Gra-
ham [15]. More generally, it appears the
Supreme Court was mainly interested in
restoring a more rounded, thorough inquiry
to the evaluation of obviousness: “Graham
set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts,
where appropriate, to look at any secondary
considerations that would prove instruc-
tive.” [16] As stated by the Supreme Court,
“[r]igid preventative rules that deny
factfinders recourse to common sense, how-
ever, are neither necessary under our case
law nor consistent with it.” [17]As such, the
Supreme Court reversed the findings of the
Federal Circuit, which had found the Tele-
flex patent valid, and remanded the case
back to the lower court with directions to an-
alyze, without rigid adherence to the TSM
test, whether theTeleflex patent was obvious
[18].
The Supreme Court’s ruling in KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. that the Federal Cir-
cuit apply itsTSM test less rigidly may have
implications for those seeking biotechnol-
ogy patents in the future. As discussed
above, the large investments necessary to
develop a marketable biotechnology product
demand that entrepreneurs making those in-
vestments be reasonably assured that they
can predict any future legal hurdles in
patenting their invention and in ultimately
protecting their patent. As explained by the
Biotechnology Industry Organization in its
amicus curiae brief in KSR Int’l Co. v. Tele-
flex, Inc., “[i]nvestment thus is predicated on
an expected return on investment in the form
of products or services that are protected by
patents whose validity can be fairly deter-
mined.” [19] Therefore, the Supreme
Court’s insistence that the Federal Circuit no
longer rigidly rely on theTSM test could in-
crease uncertainty in the grant of future
patents. However, the Supreme Court’s re-
fusal to completely dismiss the TSM test,
while in fact endorsing its continued use, al-
beit on a less rigid basis, has to be viewed
as a profound victory for an industry with a
significant stake in maintaining the status
quo. Moreover, it is unclear how much the
Supreme Court’s holding in KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc. will truly change the legal
analysis of the lower courts, given the evi-
dence that lower courts already were inde-
pendently shifting away from rigid
adherence to the TSM test before the
Supreme Court’s ruling [20].
More importantly, several aspects of the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc. seem to directly address rel-
evant concerns of the biotechnology market
in favorable ways. First, the Supreme Court
made clear that though a product is the result
of a combination of elements that were “ob-
vious to try,” it is not necessarily “obvious”
under the PatentAct. Retaining the possibil-
ity that “obvious to try” inventions still may
be patentable is extremely important to the
biotechnology industry in particular because
“many patentable inventions in biotechnol-
ogy spring from known components and
methodologies found in [the] prior art.” [21]
Rather than foreclosing all “obvious to try”
inventions as being obvious, and therefore
not patentable, the Supreme Court instead
explained that where there is “a design need
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there are a finite number of identified, pre-
dictable solutions,” it is more likely that a
person of ordinary skill would find it obvi-
ous to pursue “known options.” [22] Thus,
the proper inquiry, as stated by the Supreme
Court, is “whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions.”
[23]While this reasoning may prevent some
“obvious to try” inventions from being
patented, it is unlikely to have a substantial
effect on inventions in the biotechnology
market because “most advances in biotech-
nology are only won through great effort and
expense, and with only a low probability of
success in achieving the claimed invention
at the outset.” [24] In other words, it would
be hard to characterize the use of prior art in
the biotechnology context as predictable
based on the inherent unpredictability of ob-
taining favorable results. As such, most
biotechnology inventions would presumably
fall outside the Supreme Court’s “obvious to
try” reasoning due to the very nature of the
industry, meaning they would remain
patentable under the Supreme Court’s KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. decision.
Second, the Supreme Court recognized
the “distortion caused by hindsight bias” and
the importance of avoiding “arguments re-
liant upon ex post reasoning,” though it less-
ened the Federal Circuit’s rigid protection
against hindsight bias [24]. Hindsight bias
requires that obviousness be viewed at the
time the invention was made, because what
may seem revolutionary at the time of inven-
tion may, upon the passage of time, seem
“obvious.” Cognizance of hindsight bias is
crucial for biotechnology patents because
“there often is a long ‘passage of time be-
tween patent application filing and litigation
with biotechnology inventions [that] can ex-
acerbate the problem’ of hindsight bias.”
[25] The problem is further exacerbated by
the “significantly longer durations of com-
mercial utility” biotechnology inventions
enjoy as compared to those in other fields
[25]. The more time between the filing of a
patent and the subsequent litigation over its
validity, the greater the risk that “reliable ac-
counts of [the] context” in which the discov-
ery is made will no longer exist [26]. As
such, inventions that were not obvious when
they were created will be inescapably col-
ored by the passage of time and by new
knowledge and discoveries; the likelihood
of this occurrence is higher the further re-
moved the litigation is from the patent filing
date. Once again, however, it seems clear
that despite the Supreme Court’s abandon-
ment of the TSM test’s rigidity, strong pro-
tections against hindsight bias still were
emphasized in the Supreme Court’s KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. decision. In fact,
lower courts applying KSR Int’l Co. v. Tele-
flex, Inc. acknowledge they are “cautious”
to avoid “using hindsight” in biotechnology
obviousness determinations [27].
Finally, the Supreme Court seems to be-
lieve that the imposition of a more flexible
approach will be more likely to benefit mar-
kets not directly at issue in KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc. The Supreme Court asserted,
“[t]he diversity of inventive pursuits and of
modern technology counsels against limit-
ing the analysis” to the rigidTSM test of the
Federal Circuit [28].This language suggests
that the Supreme Court expects lower courts
to take into consideration the special consid-
erations facing unique markets, such as the
biotechnology market.As such, the specific
concerns of the biotechnology market dis-
cussed above may receive more attention
under the flexible framework asserted by the
Supreme Court in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc.
Leading up to the oral argument in KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., there was wide-
spread speculation that the case could result
in a watershed moment, significantly alter-
ing the definition of obviousness in patent
law. For many, including those in the
biotechnology industry, there was ample
reason to be concerned. Any change in the
definition of obviousness would effectively
shift property rights from new patent holders
to old, or vice versa. However, the Supreme
Court acted with restraint. While the deci-
sion purports to make substantial changes by
doing away with the Federal Circuit’s TSM
test, the opinion seems more like a mild-
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become too complacent in the implementa-
tion of their beloved test. If anything, the
Supreme Court’s insistence on a more flex-
ible formula is simply a call for lower courts
to employ common sense, in addition to
considering the factors from Graham and
the TSM test. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court’s opinion in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc. is unlikely to have a pronounced effect
on the biotechnology market, despite the
widespread concern generated before the ac-
tual decision was handed down.
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